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Abstract
I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent
can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information.
1 Introduction
Williamson (1985) considered the dilemma faced by a firm deciding to acquiring a
supplier. If it does, it has better inside information on the cost of production and
more authority on the management of the “upstream firm”. On the other hand the
acquisition weakens the “power” of the incentives faced by the supplier. For Riordan
(1990), by acquiring its supplier, the downstream firm takes control of its information
and management; it obtains better information but at the same time looses the ability to
measure objectively the performance of the management of its supplier, whose incentives
to provide efforts are weakened. The improvement in information flows alleviates an
adverse selection problem but creates a moral hazard problem. The same theme has
been visited by a number of other papers in the literature: Prat (2005), for instance,
summarized the conclusions of Cre´mer (1995), Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999)
and Holmstro¨m (1999) in the following way: “In these three instances, transparency is
bad for discipline (the agent works less) but it is good for sorting (it is easier to identify
agent type).”
∗This paper was presented at the session “Theories of Internal Organization and Vertical Integration”
at the 24th Annual Congress of the European Economic Association in Barcelona (Spain). I wish to
thank Guido Friebel, Bruno Jullien, Andrea Prat, Jean Tirole an anonymous referee and specially Bing
Ye for helpful comments. A file containing more details of the computations is available at http://
cremeronline.com/research/BarcelonaDetails.pdf.
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In this paper, I point out that limiting the information flow between the agent and the
principal can mitigate problems of adverse selection as well as problems of moral hazard.
In order to do so, I study a model where a principal must enter into a “Baron-Myerson”
type relationship with an agent chosen in a large pool. In each period, the cost parameter
of the agent is drawn from a distribution that depends on his “type” or “quality”. In the
second period, the principal must decide whether to rehire her first period agent, or to
pick another one. If she has obtained positive information about the first period agent,
she will, of course, rehire him, and will hire another one otherwise. This model is similar
to the model in Cre´mer (1995), with moral hazard replaced by adverse selection.1
We will compare the optimal contract from the viewpoint of the principal under
two information structures. Under the “direct information” structure, during the first
period the principal observes the quality of the agent. Ex-post, she finds it in her best self
interest to rehire him if he turns out to be of good quality, whatever his first period cost
parameter. In the “arm’s length” information structure, she only observes the reported
cost of the agent. Theorem 1 shows under which circumstances arm’s length information
structures can dominate direct information structures.
In the first period, the principal would like to acquire information about the quality of
the agent and information about his cost parameter. Direct information is always better
at providing information about the quality, but can be worse at providing information
about the first period cost parameter. As usual in adverse selection models, the binding
revelation constraint is the constraint on the low cost agent, who would like to pretend
that he has a high cost. With arm’s length relationships, he has more incentives to
announce a low cost parameter as this signals a high quality, and therefore increases
his probability of being rehired in the second period, which will lead to extra rents.
Therefore, the incentives to announce a low cost are more powerful with arm’s length
relationships, for very much the same reasons that the incentives to provide more effort
are higher in a moral hazard model.
2 Model and results
2.1 The static building block
The basic building block of our model is a simple Baron-Myerson (Baron and Myerson
(1982)) framework with two possible levels of marginal cost, as studied, for instance,
by Laffont and Martimort (2001). The payoff, or profit, of the principal is V (q)− t
where q is the quantity produced and t the monetary transfer from the principal to the
1As the referee as pointed out, the literature contains other examples of parallelism between moral
hazard and adverse selection models. For instance, the ratchet effect has been studied in pure adverse
selection frameworks (Weitzman, 1980; Freixas, Guesnerie and Tirole, 1985; Laffont and Tirole, 1988) and
in frameworks with a moral hazard component (Meyer and Vickers, 1997). See also Milgrom (1987)
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agent. The utility of the agent is t−θq where β takes value θ1 with probability p1 and
value θ2 > θ1 with probability p2 = 1− p1. Using the revelation principle, and with
standard notation, the problem of the principal is written as follows:
max p1(V (q1)− t1)+ p2(V (q2)− t2) (1)
subject to t1−θ1q1 ≥ 0, (PBM1 )
t2−θ2q2 ≥ 0, (PBM2 )
t1−θ1q1 ≥ t2−θ1q2, (I BM1 )
t2−θ2q2 ≥ t1−θ2q1. (I BM2 )
At equilibrium, only constraints (PBM2 ) and (I
BM
1 ) are binding. Solving for t1 and t2,
and substituting in (1), the expected profit of the principal is
S(p1)
def
= max
q1,q2
p1
(
V (q1)−θ1q1− (θ2−θ1)q2
)
+(1− p1)
(
V (q2)−θ2q2
)
. (2)
A straightforward application of the envelope theorem shows that the function S is
increasing in p1.
We will also need to define the expected rent of an agent who does not yet know his
quality: imagine that an agent is suddenly called by the principal, who tells him to come
and examine the project to determine what his cost will be (he will sign the contract only
after knowing this cost). Then, because is rent is equal to 0 if his cost parameter is θ2,
his expected rent is
R(p1)
def
= p1(t1−θ1q1), (3)
with, of course, q1 and t1 taken to be equal to their optimal values in the problem of the
principal.
2.2 Two period dynamics
We now embed our simple static Baron-Myerson model in a two period model. There
is large pool of ex-ante undistinguishable agents. Each of them can be either a “good
quality” agent or a “bad quality” agent:
ã In each period, a good quality agent has a probability pi1 that his cost param-
eter is θ1 and a probability pi2 = 1−pi1 that it is θ2. The cost parameters are drawn
independently in each period.
ã On the other hand, bad quality agents always have a cost parameter equal to θ2.
A proportion γ1 of agents are good quality agents, and at the outset, neither the
principal, nor the agent know anything about either the quality of the agent or his cost
parameter. Therefore, the unconditional probability that the cost parameter of a randomly
chosen agent is θ1 is
p1
def
= γ1×pi1.
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In the first period, the principal picks an agent randomly and offers him a contract.
Then, the agent examines at no cost the project and learns his first period cost parameter,
but he does not learn his quality; he either refuses the contract or accepts it, in which
case the contract is executed. I assume that there is “not enough time” for the principal
to offer the contract to another agent in case she picked a bad quality agent — she is
stuck with the first agent.
In the second period, given the information that she has acquired in the first period,
the principal either offers a new contract to the first period agent, or picks another agent.
In either case, the continuation game is similar to the game in the first period.
In Cre´mer (1995), I assumed that the principal could offer a two period contract,
but imposed a renegotiation proofness constraint. It is much simpler to assume that the
principal can only offer one period contracts; it does not change the economic insights,
and I believe, but am not entirely sure, that it does not change the results at all.
We now look at a two period problem in which the principal may or may not have
information at the end of the first period. We first consider the case where the principal
has direct information, that is where she learns the quality of the agent at the end of the
first period.
2.3 The principal has direct information about the quality of the agent
At the end of period the principal learns the quality of the first period agent: she will
rehire him if, and only if, he is of good quality. When she rehires the agent, she will assign
a probability pi1 to the fact that the cost parameter is θ1; therefore her second-period
payoff will be S(pi1) and the second period rent of the agent is R(pi1).
The decision to rehire the agent does not depend on his first period actions. Hence,
the revelation principle holds and the optimal first period contract is the solution of
max p1(V (q1)− t1)+ p2(V (q2)− t2) (4)
subject to t1+R(pi1)−θ1q1 ≥ 0, (Pdi1 )
t2+
γ1(1−pi1)
1− γ1pi1 R(pi1)−θ2q2 ≥ 0, (P
di
2 )
t1−θ1q1 ≥ t2−θ1q2, (I di1 )
t2−θ2q2 ≥ t1−θ2q1. (I di2 )
The Incentive Compatibility constraints are the same as in (I BM1 ) and (I
BM
2 ): the first
period announcements by the agent does not affect the second period. On the other hand,
the Participation constraints are modified. Equation (Pdi1 ) stems from the fact that if
his cost parameter is equal to θ1, the agent knows that he is a good quality agent. He
therefore knows that he will be rehired and obtain rents equal to R(pi1) in the second
period (we are assuming that the discount rate is equal to 0 for the agents and for the
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principal). On the other hand, the agent whose cost parameter is θ2 assigns a probability
equal to
γ1× (1−pi1)
γ1× (1−pi1)+(1− γ1)×1 =
γ1(1−pi1)
1− γ1pi1
to the fact that he is of good quality. If he is, he will be rehired; if he is of bad quality, he
will not be rehired. Hence, the Participation constraint (Pdi2 ).
We can use the same solution technique as in the one period model. First, it is easy to
check that if (Pdi2 ) and (I
di
1 ) both hold, so does (P
di
1 ). We then drop the constraint (I
di
2 )
and verify later that the solution which we find satisfies that constraint. Constraints (Pdi2 )
and (I di1 ) must be strictly satisfied, which enables us to compute t1 and t2. Substituting
in the objective function, the principal chooses q1 and q2 by maximizing
p1 (V (q1)−θ1q2−θ1q1)+ p2 (V (q2)−θ2q2)+ γ1(1−pi1)1− γ1pi1 R(pi1).
Therefore the optimal q1 and q2 are the same as in the one period model;2 the principal’s
first period profit is
S(p1)+
γ1(1−pi1)
1− γ1pi1 R(pi1), (5)
and that her total profit over both periods is
S(p1)+
γ1(1−pi1)
1− γ1pi1 R(pi1)+ γ1S(pi1)+(1− γ1)S(p1)
= (2− γ1)S(p1)+ γ1S(pi1)+ γ1(1−pi1)1− γ1pi1 R(pi1). (6)
2.4 Profits under arm’s length information structure
With an arm’s length relationship structure, the principal bases her decision to retain the
first period agent on the basis of his choices. One could imagine that pooling or semi-
pooling contracts would be optimal, but we will restrict ourselves to fully discriminating
contracts where the principal offers in the first period two transfer-output pairs in such
a way that the agent chooses (ti,qi) when his cost parameter is θi. Therefore the agent
will be rehired whenever he chooses (t1,q1), as the principal will know that he is of good
quality. He will not be rehired if he chooses (t2,q2): through Bayesian updating, the
principal assigns a probability strictly smaller than γ1 to the fact that he is of high quality.
Although I have not proved it, I believe that separating first period contracts are
optimal for the principal, at least for a large set of parameters. It is true that the “ratchet
2This implies q1 > q2 at the optimum, and therefore, by the same reasoning as in the one period case
that (I di2 ) is satisfied.
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effect” literature3 has stressed the fact that in many cases when a principal cannot commit
to a long term contract with an agent, she will offer a first period contract which leads to
bunching: both types of the agent will be offered the same output - transfer pair. The
reason is clear: because the agent knows that in the second period the principal will use
her knowledge of his quality to reduce his rent, it is very difficult for the principal to
extract the information. In the model of this paper, two effects counteract this tendency
to bunching. First, because there is imperfect correlation between the cost parameters
in both periods, the agent will receive some rents in the second period, and hence will
have fewer reasons to hide his quality. Second, the principal has the opportunity to hire
another agent in the second period, in case she obtains negative information about the
first period agent, and hence has stronger incentives to offer separating contracts.
Even if it were true that separating first period contracts were not optimal, the main
result of this paper, Theorem 1 would still hold: the proof establishes that there exists a
separating arm’s length contract which is better than the best direct information contract;
a fortiori, a superior pooling or semi-pooling contract would also be better.
The optimal separating first period contract is the solution of
max p1(V (q1)− t1)+ p2(V (q2)− t2) (7)
subject to t1+R(pi1)−θ1q1 ≥ 0, (Pal1 )
t2−θ2q2 ≥ 0, (Pal2 )
t1+R(pi1)−θ1q1 ≥ t2−θ1q2, (I al1 )
t2−θ2q2 ≥ t1−θ2q1+ γ1(1−pi1)p2 R(pi1). (I
al
2 )
The term R(pi1) in the left hand sides of equations (Pal1 ) and (I
al
1 ) is the expected second
period rent of an agent who truthfully reports that his first period cost parameter is θ1.
The term γ1(1− pi1)R(pi1)/p2 in the right hand side of (I al2 ) is the expected second
period rent of an agent whose first period cost parameter is equal to θ2 if he is rehired in
the second period when the principal believes that he is of good quality: with probability
(γ1(1−pi1))/p2 he is indeed of high quality and obtains rent R(pi1). Otherwise, he is of
bad quality. In this case, his second period cost parameter is θ2 with probability 1, and
he obtains no rent.
Obviously, (Pal2 ) and (I
al
1 ) imply (I
al
1 ). As usual, we will solve the problem by
dropping (I al2 ), and it is possible to check later that it is fulfilled by the solution that we
identify. The two remaining constraints must be met strictly and substituting in (7) we
obtain
p1 (V (q1)−θ1q1− (θ2−θ1)q2)+ p2 (V (q2)−θ2q2)+ p1R(pi1).
3See, for instance, Laffont and Tirole (1988) and the literature quoted therein.
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Therefore, the first period quantities will be the same as in the one period model, and the
first period profit of the principal is
S(p1)+ p1R(pi1). (8)
Because the first period agent is rehired if and only if his first period cost parameter
is θ1, the two period profit of the principal is
S(p1)+ p1R(pi1)+ p1S(pi1)+(1− p1)S(p1) = (2− p1)S(p1)+ p1S(pi1)+ p1R(pi1). (9)
2.5 Comparing direct information and arm’s length relationships
We now turn to the main aim of this paper, comparing the two structures of information.
We begin by focusing our attention on the first period payoffs before turning to the topic
of main interest, the total payoffs over both periods.
From equations (5) and (8), the first period profit of the principal is larger under
arm’s length relationships than under direct information if and only if γ1 ≤ (2pi1−1)/pi12.
Therefore, an increase in γ1 favors direct information while an increase in pi1 favors arm’s
length relationships (because the function (2x− 1)/x2 in increasing for x ∈ (1/2,1]).
Details are messy,4 but two basic effects are at play. In the case of direct information,
the relevant constraint is the participation constraint of agents with high first period
cost parameters; when γ1 is larger, they assign a larger probability to the fact that they
are unlucky high quality agents. In the case of arm’s length relationships, the relevant
constraint is the incentive constraint of agents with low first period cost parameters; the
larger pi1, the more likely they are to be rehired. It is quite striking that arm’s length
relationship do not necessarily provide stronger first period incentives.
The second period payoff of the principal is obviously greater with direct information;
we now compare her aggregate payoff over two periods to see if this effect always
dominates an eventual lower first profit payoff. From (6) and (9), the principal will prefer
not to obtain information about the quality of the agent in the first period, if and only if
(2− p1)S(p1)+ p1S(pi1)+ p1R(pi1)≥ (2− γ1)S(p1)+ γ1S(pi1)+ γ1(1−pi1)1− γ1pi1 R(pi1)
⇐⇒
(
pi1− 1−pi11− γ1pi1
)
R(pi1)≥ (1−pi1)(S(pi1)−S(γ1pi1)). (10)
When γ1 = 1, the left hand side of this equation is equal to (pi1− 1)R(pi1) < 0 while
the left hand side is equal to 0: hence if there are many good quality agents, the direct
4We are really interested in understanding the relative changes in γ1(1−pi1)/(1− γ1pi1) and p1 = pi1γ1
as γ1 and pi1 vary. When γ1 increases, the first quantity increase “more”; when pi1 increases, p1 increases
while the fraction decreases.
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information information structure is better than the arm’s length structure. When γ1
decreases, both the left and right hand sides decrease, but I am enable to conduct a
general comparative statics exercise.5 To examine the problem further, let us turn
to a family of examples, where we set V (q) = 2
√
q and θ1 = 1. This yields q1 = 1,
q2 = (1− p1)2/(θ2− p1)2, S(p1) = (1− (2−θ2)p1)/(θ2− p1) and
R(p1) = p1(1− p1)2 θ2−1
(θ2− p1)2 ,
which enable us to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exist values of the parameters such that the arm’s length relationship
information structure yields a larger profit for the principal than the direct information
information structure.
Proof. Simply substitute pi1 = 0.8, θ2 = 1.2, and γ1 = 0.5 to show that the payoff of the
principal under arm’s length relationships is equal to 1.736 while her payoff under direct
information is equal to 1.731667.
Contrary to the case with moral hazard treated in Cre´mer (1995), there is no easy way
to derive comparative statics results. Within the family of examples which we have just
described, numerical computations show that an increase in θ2 favors direct information.
Figure 1 presents the results of numerical computations and shows quite clearly that there
is no simple comparative statics. For instance, the left panel of the figure shows that for
given values of θ2 and γ1, direct information can be optimal for small and large values
of pi1, but not for intermediate values. Given the results of Drugov (2009), which shows
how complicated the comparative statics are in the simplest Baron-Myerson model, this
is not surprising.
3 Conclusion
We have been able to show that limiting the information flow can alleviate adverse
selection problems, very much in the same way as it can alleviate moral hazard problems.
However, this effect seems to be more important when there is moral hazard, as intuition
would suggest. First, contrary to what happens with moral hazard, first period payoff
is not necessarily larger with arm’s length relationship than with direct information.
Second, the numerical investigation found rather small sets of parameters for which
arm’s length relationships dominated. This does not imply that the result is without
practical importance: it points out that the loss of objective information linked to vertical
separation can, at least in part, be compensated by greater incentives to reveal private
information.
5This seems to be extremely difficult, as, for instance, R(pi1) is not monotone in pi1. (See Drugov (2009)
for a discussion of the difficulties of comparative statics in the standard Baron-Myerson problem.)
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Figure 1: These two families of graphs present the comparative statics of the choice
between arm’s length relationship and direct information. On the left hand side
panel, I represent how this choice is affected for different values of γ1 by changes
in pi1: for each pi1 the graphs represent the limit value of θ2 for which arm’s length
relationships will be chosen. Below the curves, arm’s length relationships yield a
higher payoff to the principal. Above the curves, direct information is better. The
right hand side panel shows the same data, keeping pi1 fixed and varying γ1.
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